中国崛起，海外华人展示世界实力
来源：英国《卫报》
以全球对中国的感知来看，2008年是喧嚣的一年，而现在距离北京奥运还有59天。在西藏事件、奥运火炬传递风波之后，紧跟着发生四川地震的悲剧。同情与怜悯，加上对中国政府救灾工作的钦佩，软化了那些令人不舒服的记忆。世界正在上一个关于中国的速成班。
我们对这些事件的看法毫无疑问是根据我们西方人的心态。问题在于世界的中心已经从西方转移，超越我们的假想，获得更广阔的视野变得越发重要。
我们对西藏事件感到义愤，却很大程度上忽视了一点：在大多数城市的示威中，支持奥运的人数比反对的要多得多。在世界各地，那些表态支持北京奥运的人们绝大多数是华人——或是来自中国大陆的学生，或是来自当地华人社区的人们。
很多国家早就有华人，有的可以追溯到19世纪，而在东南亚，则可以追溯到更早的时期。这个群体常常是非常多元化的，有来自香港和中国南方的第若干代移民，还有大批贫穷的非法的新移民；留学生的数量不断增长；那些与中国新兴海外经济利益相关的华人——特别在中国周边国家。据估计，目前至少有50万华人居住在非洲，他们大部分人是最近才去那片大陆的。在印尼、马来西亚和泰国，各有超过700万的华人；在缅甸和俄罗斯，各有超过100万；在秘鲁有130万，在美国有330万，在澳大利亚有70万，在英国有40万——总共大约有4000万，而且这个数字几乎肯定低估了不少。
尽管从来源地和逗留时间的长短来看，华人社区呈多样性，但他们有非常强烈的共同身份感，对中国有强大的依恋，这种感觉往往超越地域和政治分歧。这种亲和力有多方面表现。海外华人在中国的经济增长中发挥关键作用，自上世纪70年代末以来，流入中国的投资大部分来自海外华人。根据世界银行的数据，在2007年，中国收到近260亿美元的汇款，仅次于印度。
就许多移民的情况而言，生活在海外的移民比国内的民众享有更高的声望；但华人的情况却相反。中间王国（Middle Kingdom，中国）所散发的声望到达这样的程度：最近的移民往往比那些长期生活在海外社区的成员享有更多的尊重。在以前，中国往往看不起那些离开其领土的人们，但自从三十年前开始改革时期以来，政府越来越重视海外华人社群，寻求与他们建立更密切的文化和经济联系。
不难想象很多海外华人为中国崛起而骄傲。经过两个世纪的贫困与失败，他们的祖国在相当短时间内崛起成为全球瞩目的、魅力十足的伟大国家。全世界的电视频道都在播放关于中国的节目，在很多国家有很多人参加中文普通话课程。难怪中国对海外华人社群的吸引力因此显著增加。我儿子所在的周日汉语（Sunday Mandarin）学校决定停课一天，就是为了自豪地参加伦敦奥运火炬传递的庆祝活动。对他们而言，中国如同归家，正受到他们归化城市（adopted city）的拥抱。中国的成就和奥运所意味的全球承认带来真实的愉悦。
那么多城市里那么多的华人走到街上支持北京奥运，海外华人被证明是一股强大的政治势力，无论是在他们的归化国还是对中国政府而言。当然，这种现象不算新，华人也并非特例：很多国家的移民长久以来就发挥重要作用支持自己的祖国，最近最显著的例子就是犹太人对以色列的支持。
然而，华人有三个特点，这三个特点加在一起令他们与别不同。首先，华人数量庞大，遍布全球。第二，由于历史和文化原因，华人对中间王国有不同寻常的强烈认同感。第三，中国已经是一个全球大国，而且可能注定成为世界上最强大的国家。随着中国继续崛起，中国在全球的影响力成倍增长，华人就可能获得更大的扩张；借助中国的经济成就越发昌盛；由于中国的地位提升而享有日增的威望；对中国感到更加亲近。
不过即便这样，从历史上看，华人的影响力还是远不如欧洲移民的影响力。迄今为止，海外华人的增长主要是因为中国的贫困，但欧洲移民则不同，主要是欧洲殖民扩张的作用。如今我们习惯上说西方和西方世界，但事实上，这或多或少等同于欧洲和欧洲移民的土地，或者如经济历史学家麦迪逊（Angus Maddison）所描述的“西方分支”。西方已经主导世界两百年。无论中国可能变得多么强大，现在还难以想象它的华人将发挥欧洲移民曾有的那种影响力。（原标题：中国实力增长，海外华人开始展示它的世界实力；作者：Martin Jacques）
译文为摘译，英文原文地址：http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/11/china.comment
英文原文：
As China's power grows, the diaspora starts to flex its worldwide muscle
Poverty once drove their mass emigration, but the overseas Chinese now revel in the status and wealth of their homeland
Martin Jacques The Guardian, Wednesday June 11 2008
Already 2008 has proved a tumultuous year in terms of global perceptions of China, and there are still 59 days to go until the Beijing Olympics. The tragedy of the Sichuan earthquake followed hard on the heels of the riots in Tibet and the demonstrations surrounding the Olympic torch relay. Sympathy and compassion, combined with admiration for the rescue efforts of the Chinese government, served to soften the harsh memory of the riots in Lhasa and the blue-tracksuited Chinese officials. The world is having a crash course on China.
Inevitably, our view of these events is shaped by our western mindset. The problem is that as the global centre of gravity tilts away from the west, it is becoming increasingly important to look beyond our assumptions and gain a wider picture. We failed miserably in this respect on the Burma cyclone, behaving as if all that counted were western attitudes and aid, and only belatedly recognising that the key to unlocking the junta's resistance was the cooperation of its neighbours, together with the UN. In our indignation over Tibet we also largely failed to notice that in a large majority of cities the demonstrations in support of the Olympics were much bigger than those against.
True, in London, Paris, Athens and San Francisco pro-Tibet demonstrators greatly outnumbered those expressing support for the games. In Canberra, however, 10,000 demonstrated in favour of the games, hugely outnumbering the protesters. In Seoul thousands turned out in support, as they did in Nagano in Japan, in both cases dwarfing the number of protesters; likewise in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City and Hong Kong. Everywhere, those demonstrating support for the Beijing games were overwhelmingly comprised of Chinese - either students from the mainland or people from the local Chinese community.
The Chinese diaspora is long established in many countries, sometimes dating back to the 19th century, or much earlier in south-east Asia. It is often very diverse, combining several-generation settlers from Hong Kong and southern China with a large wave of new migrants, many poor and illegal; growing numbers of students; and those connected with China's burgeoning overseas economic interests, who are especially to be found in the countries around its borders. It is estimated that there are now at least half a million Chinese living in Africa, most of whom have arrived very recently. There are more than 7 million Chinese in each of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, more than 1 million each in Burma and Russia, 1.3 million in Peru, 3.3 million in the US, 700,000 in Australia and 400,000 in this country - about 40 million in all, which is almost certainly a considerable underestimate.
Notwithstanding the diversity of their communities - in terms of origin and length of stay - the overseas Chinese enjoy an extremely strong sense of shared identity as well as a powerful attachment to China, feelings that tend to override regional and political differences. This affinity finds expression in many ways. The overseas Chinese have played a crucial role in China's economic growth, providing the lion's share of inward investment since the late 1970s. According to the World Bank, in 2007 China received more remittances - nearly $26bn - than any other country except India.
In the case of many diasporas, those living overseas tend to enjoy greater prestige than those at home; the reverse is true of the Chinese. Status emanates from the Middle Kingdom, to the extent that more recent migrants tend to enjoy higher esteem than longer-established members of an overseas community. Until recently, indeed, China tended to look down upon those who had left its territory, but since the reform period began almost three decades ago the government has increasingly come to value Chinese overseas communities and sought to establish closer cultural and economic links with them.
It is not difficult to imagine the pride that many overseas Chinese take in China's rise. After two centuries during which their homeland was synonymous with poverty and failure, it has risen to a position of great global prominence and allure in a remarkably short space of time. Television channels the world over are pouring out programmes about China, and in many countries people are signing up in large numbers to learn Mandarin. Not surprisingly, the gravitational pull exercised by China on its overseas communities has increased markedly as a result. My son's Sunday Mandarin school decided to cancel lessons for the day in order to proudly join the London festivities for the Olympic relay. For them China was coming home and being embraced by their adopted city. There was genuine delight in China's achievement and the global recognition that the Olympics signified.
In taking to the streets in so many cities and in such large numbers in support of the Beijing Olympics, the overseas Chinese proved a powerful political force both in their adopted countries and for the Chinese government. This kind of phenomenon, of course, is neither new nor particularly Chinese: diasporas in many countries have long played a significant role in support of their homeland, the most striking recent example being that provided by the Jewish diaspora for Israel.
The Chinese diaspora, however, has three characteristics that together mark it out as distinct. First, it is numerically large and spread all around the globe, from Africa to Europe, east Asia to the Americas. Second, for historical and cultural reasons, it enjoys an unusually strong identification with the Middle Kingdom. Third, China is already a global power and destined to become perhaps the most powerful country in the world. And as its rise continues, as Chinese worldwide interests grow exponentially, the Chinese diaspora is likely to expand greatly; become increasingly prosperous, buoyed by China's own economic success; enjoy growing prestige as a result of China's rising status; and feel an even closer affinity with China.
Even then, however, to retain a sense of historical proportion, the Chinese diaspora will remain far less influential than the European diaspora. Such is the latter's ubiquity and longevity that we tend to take it for granted, often even failing to recognise its existence, let alone its huge influence and unique nature. Unlike the Chinese diaspora, whose growth hitherto has overwhelmingly been driven by China's poverty, the European diaspora was largely a function of Europe's colonial expansion. The European diaspora's most important monuments are those countries in which white settlers managed to establish themselves in the majority, once they had effectively eliminated the host population; namely the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Today we habitually speak of the west and the western world, but these, in fact, are more or less synonymous with Europe and its diasporic lands, or what the economic historian Angus Maddison describes as "western offshoots". That west, as we are aware, has dominated the world for the past 200 years. However powerful China might become, it seems inconceivable that its diaspora will ever exercise the kind of influence that Europe's has.
· Martin Jacques is a visiting research fellow at the Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics